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ASSUMPTION OF RISK
FUMING{ JAMESF, JR. t
THE term assumption of risk has led to no little confusion because it is
used to refer to at least two different concepts, which largely overlap, have a
common cultural background, and often produce the same legal result.1
But these concepts are nevertheless quite distinct rules involving slightly
different policies and different conditions for their application. (1) In its
primary sense the plaintiff's assumption of a risk is only the counterpart of
the defendant's lack of duty to protect the plaintiff from that risk. In such
a case plaintiff may not recover for his injury even though he was quite
reasonable in encountering the risk that caused it.2  'olenti non fit injuria.
(2) A plaintiff may also be said to assume a risk created by defendant's
breach of duty towards him, when he deliberately chooses to encounter that
risk. In such a case, except possibly in master and servant cases, plaintiff
will be barred from recovery only if he was unreasonable in encountering
the risk under the circumstances. This is a form of contributory negligence.3
Hereafter we shall call this "assumption of risk in a secondary sense."
This study, except for the section on master and servant cases, will be
concerned exclusively with assumption of risk in the primary sense, i.e. as
the counterpart of defendant's lack of duty. But even in the field thus limited
there lurks an ambiguity. There are many risks which are not, in any real
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1. Under some statutes they do not produce the same results. Sce, e.g., Tiller v.
Atlantic C. L. R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 62 ct seq. (1943) (describing the situation under the
Federal Employers Liability Act both before and after the 1939 amendment); Campbell,
IVisconsi,'s Comparative Negligcncc Law, 7 WVis. L. rEv. 7222, 235 (1932); Whelan,
Comparative Negligence [1938] Wis. L. Rnv. 465, 482; WILLIAS, Joxi-r ToraS & Con;-
TmmUToay NEGLIGENCE, C. 12 (1951) (describing the situation under comparative negli-
gence statutes).
2. Warren, Volcnti Non Fit Iniuria, 8 ILRv. L. REv. 457 (1S95); Bohlen, Volfumtar,
Assumption of Risk, 20 HAl,., L. RFv.g 14, 91 (1910) ; Gow%.,, The Deloense of T'olentl Non
Fit Injuria, 61 Jumtn. Ra,. 37 (1949).
3. Tharp v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 332 Pa. 233, 2 A.2d 695 (1938) (choice of
dangerous route when safe route was easily available) ; Wright Y. City of St. Cioud, 54
Minn. 94, 55 N.W. 819 (1893); see REST.TE,,mNT, ToRTs §465, comments c and d
(1934).
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sense, voluntarily assumed by the plaintiff but are rather imposed by the
law. Thus in general one man does not owe another the duty to refrain
from hurting him, but only to refrain from doing so negligently; in a sense
each of us broadly assumes the risk of injuries inflicted without negligence.4
But this possible use of the expression is neither helpful nor usual.5 It is
simply an artificial way to express the rule that liability is based on fault.
There may also be express agreement to assume a risk, but that will be dealt
with later.
The term assumption of risk in its primary sense refers to risks that are
incidental to a relationship of free association between plaintiff and defendant,
that is to say one which either is at liberty to take or leave as he will.0 In
such a case defendant's duty toward plaintiff is limited. It does not extend
to the use of care to make the conditions of the relationship reasonably safe
-at most the duty is one of care to make these conditions as safe as they
appear to be and it may fall short of that.7  If these risks are fully com-
prehended, or perfectly obvious, or of the kind which plaintiff and not de-
fendant must look out for, then plaintiff will be held to have assumed them
by voluntarily entering into the relationship which entails them. Thus if one
man borrows another's automobile for his own purposes, knowing that the
tires are worn smooth and the brakes in bad order, the borrower assumes
the ordinary risks of smooth tires and bad brakes ;8 indeed, he even assumes
the risks of concealed defects in the car provided the owner does not himself
know of themY Or if one has a gratuitous permission to use the path across
4. As Bramwell, B. said, in Holmes v. Mather, LR 10 Ex. 261, 267 (1875), "For
the convenience of mankind in carrying on the affairs of life, people as they go along
roads must expect, or put up with, such mischief as reasonable care on the part of others
cannot avoid." But we have no real choice to avoid using the highways altogether.
Nor indeed would it make any difference if on the particular occasion, the plaintiff were
present quite without his will. The baby in his perambulator or the prisoner in the
patrol wagon must assume the risks of highway accidents caused without negligence
just as much as the adult who has chosen to stroll along the sidewalk rather than sit
on his front porch reading the paper. The learned judge might as well have said that
people must put up with such accidents "as they go along the road of life," at least
under a system where liability is based on fault.
5. But see SALruoND, TORTS 32 (10th ed. 1945) wherein this notion is described as a
"very important application" of the doctrine volenti non fit injuria.
6. See, e.g., Gow, supra note 2, at 37, 38, "But the essence of the defense of 'volenti'
is that there has been no breach of duty on the part of the defender; inasmuch as the
pursuer voluntarily encountered and took the risk, the defender was not owing him any
duty to take care."
The other authorities cited in note 2, supra, take the same basic position.
7. See the examples given at notes 9 and 10, infra.
8. Cf. Davis v. Sanderman, 225 Iowa 1001, 282 N.W. 717 (1939); 7 BLAsurimx ,
CYCLOPEDIA OF AuTomoBILE LAw & PRAcricE § 4672 (perm. ed. 1950); see Johnson v.
H. M. Bullard Co., 95 Conn. 251,258, 111 At1. 70,73 (1920).
9. Johnson v. H. M. Bullard Co., 95 Conn. 251, 111 At. 70 (1920); Lutz's Adm'r
v. W. J. Hughes & Sons Co., 232 Ky. 675, 24 S.W.2d 578 (1930) ; Ruth v. Hutchinson
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another's land, he takes it as he finds it and cannot expect the owner to make
or keep it safe for him.°  And even one who enters ordinary private premises
for a purpose in which the owner or possessor has an interest, takes the risk
of dangers which he fully comprehends, or which are as perfectly obvious,
as a walkway covered with glare ice in the daytime.1'
Cases like those we have been discussing have sometimes been described
as situations where the plaintiff subjects himself to a "knovm but reasonable
risk created by the defendant,"' " but this may be misleading. In determining
whether there has been voluntary assumption of risk (in the primary sense)
it is immaterial whether the risk is reasonable or not. This is true whether
the matter be considered from defendant's or from plaintiff's point of view.
Defendant may, for example, have allowed his automobile or his premises to
fall into such dangerous disrepair that he would be dearly negligent to all
those to whom he owed the duty of careful maintenance. Nevertheless he
does not owe that duty to a borrower or licensee; his failure is not negligence
to such a person.' 3 From the plaintiff's point of view, his encountering of
the risk may be reasonable or unreasonable depending on the seriousness of
the danger, the extent of his own knowledge or opportunity for kmowledge,
and the exigencies of the situation. In either event he will have assumed
the risk.'4 Not reasonableness of the risk but the voluntary character of the
Gas Co., 209 Minn. 248, 296 N.W. 136 (1941) ; and see Dickason v. Dicka.son, 84 Mont.
52, 274 Pac. 145 (1929).
10. Fitzpatrick v. Cumberland G. 11. Co., 61 N.J.L. 37S, 39 AtL. 675 (IS93);
DiMarco v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 321 Pa. 563, 183 AtL 780 (1936); Bohlen, Dty of a
Landoze-ner Towards Those Entcring his Premises of Their Ou' , Right, 69 U. or PA. L
REv. 142, 237, 340 (1921).
11. Paubel v. Hitz, 339 Mo. 274, 96 SAV.2d 369 (1936); cf. Hausman Pacling Co.
v. Badwey, 147 SAV.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); see also Ft. Worth & D.C. Ry. Co.
v. Hambright, 130 S.W.2d 436, 440 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939). But cf. Osborne v. L &
N. IV. Ry. Co., 21 Q.B.D. 220, 224 (1883), which, perhaps, is not a true case of assump-
tion of risk. See Bohlen, stipra note 2, at 19, n.5; R1sTATnzmrr, Toms § 347 and.
comment a (1934).
Of course there are many conditions which are not unreasonably dangerous if they
are known or sufficiently obvious, but which would be unreasonably dangerous if un-
known and concealed (as by darkness). An exmmple would be the top of an ordinary
flight of stairs. Hunnewell v. Haskell, 174 Mass. 557, 55 N.E. 320 (1899). The
reference in the text is not to such a condition but rather to one which-though obvious-
would constitute negligence to one who is owed the full duty of care. Thus in the
Paibel case the runway to defendant's place of business was covered witl slush from
snow, and chicken dirt. The court was at pains to distinguish cases of common halv.-ays
in an apartment and sidewalk cases, where tenants and travelers (respectively) have
rights superior to the invitee on private property. See RESTATEm:LET, TonTs § 345 (c) ii
(1934).
12. HARPER, LAw oF ToRTs 289 (1933).
13. Unless, at least, it is coupled with non-disclosure of a known, concealed defect.
See notes 8 and 9 sitpra.
14. And if he was unreasonable in taking the risk, plaintiff will also be contributorily
negligent.
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association is the gist of the defense. True assumption of risk reflects the
individualism of the common law in relationships wherein it was felt that
the duty of self-protection against many hazards rested primarily on each
participant. It is a negation of duty by one to look out affirmatively for the
other's safety.',
It is clear then that the concept of assumption of risk in the primary sense
is not to be considered in a situation where defendant has breached a duty
towards plaintiff-where the latter has "a statutory right to protection, or
... a common right or individual right at law to find these particular premises
[or appliances] free from danger . . ... ,1 This means specifically that even
when a danger is fully known and comprehended plaintiff is not barred from
recovery simply because he chooses deliberately to encounter it, in the follow-
ing situations :lr
(1) Where a traveler uses a highway which has not been closed for repairsY38
It is sometimes said that there must be "no other convenient safer way,"10
but this statement comes from confusion. The condition it implies is not valid
for any of the situations presently being discussed. 20  The existence of a safer
alternative may make the plaintiff's choice of this one an unreasonable, hence
negligent choice. 21 But it does not bar plaintiff's recovery merely because
he voluntarily chose the more dangerous way. If that choice was a reasonable
one under the circumstances it will not prevent recovery.22 Of course if a
highway has been properly closed for repairs, a traveler who ventures on to it
assumes the dangers it may present.23
15. See authorities cited in note 2 .rupra.
16. Bowen, L. J., in Thomas v. Quartermaine, 18 Q.B.D. 685, 696 (C.A. 1887).
17. He may be contributorily negligent if he does so under circumstances which
make the choice unreasonable. But that is because his encountering the risk is negligent
and not because it is voluntary.
The classification given in the text is adapted from Bohlen, supra note 2, at 19 et seq.
18. The opinion in Paubel v. Hitz, 339 Mo. 274, 281, 96 S.W.2d 369, 373 (1936),
neatly contrasts the case of the highway traveler with that of the invitee on private
premises. See note 11 supra.
19. Bohlen, supra note 2, at 19.
20. The existence of a safe alternative is altogether immaterial to assumption of
risk in the primary sense. It is not a question of whether plaintiff has a choice be-
tween a dangerous and a safe way. It is rather a question of whether defendant has a
right to put plaintiff to a choice between using a dangerous way and simply not using
it (quite without regard to whether there is a safe alternative). See cases cited in
notes 22, 24 infra.
21. Neal v. Town of Marion, 126 N.C. 412, 35 S.E. 812 (1900) ; Smith v. Pittsburgh,
338 Pa. 216, 12 A.2d 788 (1940) ; cf. Tharp v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 332 Pa. 233, 2 A,2d
695 (1938).
22. Nichols v. Town of Laurens, 96 Iowa 388 65 N.W. 335 (1895); Campion v.
City of Rochester, 202 Minn. 136, 277 N.W. 422 (1938); Patton v. City of Grafton,
116 W. Va. 311, 180 S.E. 267 (1935). But see Porter v. Toledo T. R. Co., 152 Ohio
463, 90 N.F_2d 142 (1950), which inexcusably confuses assumption of risk and con-
tributory negligence. See Note, 19 U. OF CIN. L. Rnv. 407 (1950).
23. Rogers v. Cox, 130 Conn. 616, 36 A.2d 373 (1944) ; Jones v. Collins, 177 Mass.
444, 59 N.E. 64 (1901); Johnson v. New York, 208 N.Y. 77, 101 N.E. 691 (1913);
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(2) Where a tenant (or someone in his right) uses a common approach,
hall, elevator, etc. which has remained under the control of the landlord with
the duty of safe maintenance. 24
(3) Where the patron of a public utility uses a part of its premises or its
equipment which is appropriate to be used in order to secure the services which
the utility is bound to perform for the public..
2 5
(4) Where a landowner's access to his premises has been impeded or
jeopardized by defendant's wrong, and he incurs the risk to gain the access.2 0
(5) Where defendant's wrong injures a plaintiff who is at a place where he
has a right to be without regard to defendant's consent.2 a
(6) Where plaintiff moves to a nuisance or uses his own land in such a way
as to increase the hazard caused to it by defendant's wrongful use of his land.2-
(7) Where plaintiff seeks to rescue another person, or his own or another's
property which is endangered by defendant's negligence. This is the rule today
though it has -not always been; and in these cases the English law has been
more laggard than ours. As a recent writer has put it, "The older doctrine of
Fenske v. Kramp C. Co., 207 Wis. 397, 403, 241 NAV. 349, 351 (1932) ; cf. Trasaeco v.
NYNH & HRR Co., 113 Conn. 355, 155 AUt. 493 (1931).
24. Gibson v. Hoppman, 103 Conn. 401, 143 At. 635 (1923); Dillehay v. Minor,
188 Iowa 37, 175 N.V. 83 (1920) ; Roman v. King, 289 Mo. 641, 233 S.W. 161 (1921) ;
Notes, 25 A.L.R. 1273 (1923); 39 A.LR. 294 (1925); 5S A.L.R. 1411 (1929); 75
A.L.R. 154 (1931); 97 A.L.R. 220 (1935).
25. This is the position taken by Bohlen and the Restatement. See Bohlen, Volw:-
tary Assumption of Risk, 20 H.Rv. L. Rmv 14, 19 (1910) ; REs5TATS. N.%T, o-s § 347
(1934). See Van Wagner v. West Shore R. Co., 124 N.J.L. 453, 12 A.2d 242 (1940);
cf. Lowden v. Denton, 110 F.2d 274, 277 (8th Cir. 1940) (carrier's duty as to stations
likened to "that of a municipality with regard to its public sidewalks.") ; New Orleans
& N.E.R. Co. v. Brooks, 175 Miss. 147, 154, 165 So. 804, 806 (1936). But cf. Keeton,
Assumption of Risk & the Landowner, 20 TEx. L. REv. 562, 571 (1942).
26. Clayards v. Dethick, 12 Q.B. 439 (1848) ; Hickey v. City of Valtham, 159 Mass.
460, 34 N.E. 681 (1893); REsTA T-!,E=, TORTS § S93, comment c (1939).
27. Illustrative cases are Hedding v. Pearson, 76 Cal. App2d 4S1, 173 P.2d 3,2
(1946) ; Peoples Drug Stores v. Windham, 178 Md. 172, 12 A.2d 532 (1940).
Contrast, for instance, the landowner's duty to one traveling along an adjacent high-
way with that to one entering his premises vith his consent, or even his invitation, with
regard to the dangerous condition of his building. The highway traveler assumes no
risks which reasonable care could prevent The licensee takes all risks unless they
are both concealed and known to the landowner. Even the invite takes the ris!: cf
defects he knows about and of sufficiently obvious defects. See PnossER, TORTS §§ 76,78,79
(1941).
Again, contrast the case of a highway traveler struck by a golf ball or a baseball
with the case of a player on the links or a spectator at the ball game. Castle v. St.
Augustine's Links, Ltd., 38 T.L.R. 615 (K.B. 1922), 32 Y.%LE LJ. 131 (192); notes
44-7, and 105, infra.
28. LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago 6. & St. P. R. Co., 232 U.S. 340 (1914); Judson
v. Giant P. Co., 107 Cal. 549, 40 Pac. 1020 (1S95); Taulbee v. Campbell, 241 Ky. 410, 44
S.W.2d 275 (1931) ; Note, 19 A.L.R. 423 (1922); cf. North Bend Lumber Co. v. Seattle,
116 Wash. 500, 199 Pac. 988 (1921).
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the common law has been expressed thus: 'Each for himself' meant that, in the
eyes of the law, to help someone else in an emergency was an extravagance
which the helper indulged in at his own risk and expense." 20 In this type of
case, the problem of voluntary assumption of risk overlaps the negligence prob-
lem, or rather is a phase of that problem. Thus in Eckert v. Long Island R.
Co.,30 in which the plaintiff's decedent was killed while attempting to rescue a
child imperiled by the defendant's negligence, the question was presented
whether the decedent had not voluntarily exposed himself to peril. The court
held that he had not. The problem is presented in another way by inquiring
whether the defendant's conduct constituting negligence toward the child was
also negligence toward the decedent. Under the modern view it is, since the
foreseeable consequences of an act are regarded as "including .. . the likeli-
hood of an intervening rescuer." 31 As the Iowa court has said, "Defendant
could have foretold, with almost absolute certainty, when it set the fire in
question, that plaintiff, being near, would use every reasonable means in
attempting to save Qatman's horses from the flames, and there was nothing
surprising or unusual in the chosen attempt he made. 032 Moreover the act of
the rescuer is no less foreseeable when it is deliberate than when it is spon-
taneous.3 3 Of course the means of rescue chosen might be so unreasonable as
to amount to negligence even in the light of the emergency. 4 If so plaintiff
will be barred for contributory negligence but not for want of breach of duty
towards him.
Comprehension of the Risk
It is sometimes said that knowledge or comprehension of the risk by plain-
tiff is the watchword of assumption of risk.35 In many types of situations this
is true; in others it is not. Unless the limitations which should be put on such
a statement are fully appreciated, it may be very misleading. There may be
assumption of a specific risk of which the plaintiff is completely ignorant. On
the other hand the plaintiff does not assume, in the primary sense, many risks
which he knows and fully appreciates.35 Thus the borrower of a chattel or
the licensee on land takes the risk of dangers that he does not and cannot
29. Gow, The Defense of Volenti Non Fit Injuria, 61 JURiD. REV. 37, 53 (1949).
30. 43 N.Y. 502 (1871).
31. Gow, supra note 29, at 54.
32. Liming v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 81 Iowa 246, 253, 47 N.W. 66, 68 (1890).
33. Wagner v. International R. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437, 19 A.L.R. 1 (1921).
34. Cook v. Johnston, 58 Mich. 437, 25 N.W. 388 (1885) ; Berg v. Great N. R. Co,
70 Minn. 272, 73 N.W. 648 (1897).
35. See, e.g., Cincinnati N.O. & T.P.R. Co. v. Thompson, 236 Fed. 1, 9 (6th Cir.
1916).
36. As Bowen, L.J., has said, "the maxim . . . is not 'scienti non fit injuria' but
'volenati." Thomas v. Quartermaine, 18 O.B.D. 685, 696 (C.A. 1887).
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know about5 7 And the rescuer or traveler on the highway, for instance, does
not assume the most open and obvious risks38 (though he may be negligent in
encountering them under the circumstances of any given case). The key to
the problem lies in the relationship between the parties, and the duty owed by
defendant to plaintiff under all the circumstances. It is only where (1) defend-
ant knows of the danger, or (2) is under a duty to plaintiff to use care to dis-
cover the danger, but (in either event) will fully discharge his duty to plaintiff
by complete disclosure of the danger, that plaiitiff's knowledge and compre-
hension of the risk will spell assumption of risk in the primary sense5 3 The
commonest examples of this are cases of invitor and invitee on real property 49
and (formerly, at least) master and servant. In these situations plaintiff is*"
viewed as having no right to enter into or remain within the relationship, but
only to be apprised of its risks so he can choose intelligently whether to en-
counter them. And if the risks are such that he who runs may read them,
defendant owes no further duty with respect to them. Here, indeed, compre-
hension of the risk is the watchword of the doctrine.
In such a situation at least actual comprehension of a risk by a plaintiff means
that if he voluntarily encounters it, he assumes it. But actual comprehension
implies more than knowledge of the defect that constitutes the danger. It also
includes an appreciation and an understanding of the dangers that lurk in the
defect and result in the injury, and it is usually a jury question whether there
was such appreciation in fact. 2
A different and more difficult question concerns a defendant's duty with
respect to defects which are obvious and visible or to conditions pregnant with
risks which most men would appreciate, but which this plaintiff does not see
37. See notes 9 and 10 su pra.
Some courts also hold that the gratuitous guest in a vehicle takes the driver's degree
of skill and competence as he finds it, whether he tnows about it or not. Eisenhut v.
Eisenhut, 212 Wis. 467, 250 NA. 441 (1933) ; see also notes 48, 57 infra.
Of course it might be said that the borrower or licensee will be taken to kmow and
comprehend the nature of the relationship and that as gratuitous beneficiary of it he
cannot reasonably expect its conditions to be prepared for his safety. But this is a far
different thing from the way the expression is generally used, viz., to mean Imovledge
of the specific defect and comprehension of the dangers that lurk in it for plaintiff.
38. See notes 18, 22 and 30 supra.
39. See e.g., note 11 supra, and notes 44, 46, 91, and 92 infra.
40. Or licensor and licensee or lender and borrower where the licensee or lender
knows of a danger.
41. Or, in master and servant cases, "was." As we shall see assumption ef risk is
largely abrogated by statute in master and servant cases. See notes 83, 84 infra.
42. Choctaw 0. & Ct. R. Co. v. Jones, 77 Ark. 367, 92 S.V. 244 (1906); Baer v.
Baird Mach. Co., 84 Conn. 269, 79 AtI. 673 (1911); Fitzgerald v. Connecticut R. P. Co.,
155 Mass. 155, 29 N.E. 464 (1891); Zurich G. A. & L. Ins. Co. v. Childs Co., 263 N.Y.
324, 171 N.E. 391 (1930).
In determining comprehension, the age and experience of plaintiff are to be considered.
Baer v. Baird Mach. Co., supra. Cf. Mudrich v. Standard 0. Co., 153 Ohio 31, 90
N.E.2d 859 (1950).
19521
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or does not comprehend. Elsewhere I have dealt with some aspects of this
problem.4 3 There an attempt was made to examine the extent to which his
own shortcomings would be considered in evaluating the plaintiff's conduct
as negligent or not. Now our problem is the different one of deciding the extent
to which certain defendants may assume a minimum of knowledge and per-
ceptiveness on the part of others and act on that assumption. For example, the
owner of a baseball park owes no duty to warn the experienced spectator of
the dangers of foul balls in the unscreened part of the bleachers ;41 and an
analogous situation is presented by hockey. But does the proprietor of either
sporting event owe such a duty to the uninitiated? Except for a few situations
the rule does not seem clear and opinions are too often clouded with talk about
presumptions. 45 It seems fairly safe to say, however, that there are at least
some situations whose dangers are so obvious, so customary, and so com-
monly kmown that a defendant need give no warning of them.4 0 -ere again a
plaintiff may assume a risk that he does not in fact comprehend. Yet by no
means all the dangers which would be obvious to the attentive or appreciated by
43. James, Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence Cases, 16 Mo. L. REv. 1
(1951); see also, James & Dickinson, Accident Proneness & Accident Lazo, 63 HARV.
L. REv. 769, 782 et seq. (1950).
44. Quinn v. Recreation P. Ass'n, 3 Cal.2d 725, 46 P.2d 144 (1935) (14 year old
girl familiar with baseball); Modec v. City of Eveleth, 224 Minn. 556, 29 N.W.2d 453
(1947) (hockey); Blackball v. Capital D. B. Ass'n, 154 Misc. 640, 278 N.Y. Supp. 649
(AIb. City Ct. 1935) (baseball); Kavafian v. Seattle B.C. Ass'n., 105 Wash. 215, 181
Pac. 679 (1919) (baseball). See discussion of this question in Tite v. Omaha C. Corp.,
144 Neb. 22, 12 N.W.2d 90 (1943).
45. See, e.g., Thurman v. Ice Palace, 36 Cal. App.2d 364, 97 P.2d 999, 1001 (1939)
("it is reasonable to presume that [the average person of ordinary intelligence] appre-
ciates the risk of being hit by a pitched or batted ball without being specifically warned
of such danger."); Hunt v. Thomasville B. Co., 80 Ga. App. 572, 573, 56 S.E.2d 828,
829 (1949) ; Modec v. City of Eveleth, 224 Minn. 556, 558, 29 N.W.2d 453, 454 (1947).
The word "presumption" is ambiguous. It might mean (1) a rebuttable presumption
of fact; (2) a conclusive presumption, i.e., that the law will disregard plaintiff's lack
of knowledge and therefore not allow him to show it in any case; or (3) that the
defendant may act on the assumption that all spectators have knowledge, and gauge his
conduct accordingly.
46. Thus in baseball cases the proprietor has generally been held: to fulfill his duty
if he has screened enough seats to accommodate the number of calls for them which
may reasonably be expected on an ordinary occasion, and spectators, even with limited
experience, are held to assume the risks of thrown or batted balls in the unscreened
portion of the bleachers. Brown v. San Francisco B. Club, 99 Cal. App.2d 484, 222 P.2d
19 (1950) ; Brisson v. Minneapolis B. & A. Ass'n, 185 Minn. 507, 240 N.W. 903 (1932) ;
Keys v. Alamo C. B. Co., 150 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); cf. Leek v. Tacoma
B. Club, 229 P.2d 329 (Wash. 1951) (adult assumed risk of absence of roof over screened
stands, though he did not in fact notice it at night game). But cf. Wells v. Minneapolis
B. & A. Ass'n, 122 Minn. 327, 142 N.W. 706 (1913).
A similar rule has been applied in hockey. Ingersoll v. Onondaga H. Club, 245 App,
Div. 137, 281 N.Y. Supp. 505 (3d Dep't, 1935) ; cf. Modec v. City of Eveleth, 224 Minn.
556, 29 N.W.2d 453 (1947); Elliott & Elliott v. Amphitheatre, Ltd., 3 West W. Rep.
225 (Manitoba 1934) ; but see note 49 infra.
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the experienced are thus assumed. Whether they are depends upon the kind
of relationship, the character of the place, the likelihood that attention will be
distracted, the customary behavior of people who frequent the place, the likeli-
hood that inexperienced, young, or handicapped people will be there, and the
like.47 These are of course the same factors which are to be considered on the
issue of defendant's duty, for as we have seen, the issue is the same.
Another question about knowledge of the risk is how specifically must future
dangerous conduct be comprehended? 4s A prospective guest may, for instance,
know that his driver-host has often driven carelessly. Does the guest then
assume the risks of his host's possible carelessness in driving on the present
occasion? A few courts say that he does;49 others that he does not.P The
actual decisions are not altogether harmonious or dear. Where the host is
intoxicated,51 or has a definite handicap (like being one-armed),r - the guest
47. Compare Modec v. City of Eveleth, 224 Mim. 556, 29 N.WV2d 453 (1947) uith
Tite v. Omaha C. Co., 144 Neb. 22, 12 N.W.2d 90 (19435 (pointing up the difference in
degree of general familiarity with hockey in the two states). The inexperienced hockey
spectator is generally not held, as matter of law, to assume the risks of flying pucks.
Thurman v. Ice Palace, 36 Cal. App.2d 364, 97 P.2d 999 (1939) ; Lemoine v. Springfield
H Ass'n, 307 Mass. 102, 29 N.E2d 716 (1940) ; Tite v. Omala C. Co., supra; James
v. Rhode Island Auditorium, Inc., 60 R.I. 405, 199 At. 293 (1938); Note, 31 Mfr.
L. Rav. 298 (1948) (tracing history of the sport).
Cf. Hall v. Brooklands Auto Racing Club 1 KB. 205 (1939); Macon T.P. Co. v
Graden, 79 Ga. App. 230, 53 S.E.2d 371 (1949), 3 OimA. L. Rv. 365 (1950) ; Murphy
v. Steeplechase A. Co., 250 N.Y. 479, 166 N.E. 173 (1929).
See opinion of Bowen, L. J., in Thomas v. Quartemaine, 18 Q.B.D. 635, 695 (CA.
1887) (the duty "may vary according to the age and comprehension of the visitor.")
48. In a few states the courts, without the aid of any statute, limit the host's duty
towards his guest to that of refraining from gross or from wanton negligence. Mas-Mletti
v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168 (1917); Rice, The Automobile Guest & he
Rationale of Assumption of Risk, 27 Mumn. L. Ray. 429 (1943). Of course under
such a rule the guest assumes the risks of his host's future ordinary negligence whether
he has reason to anticipate it or not. Cf. Eisenhut v. Eisenhut, 212 Wis. 467, 243 N.W.
440, 91 A.L.R. 549 (1933) (guest assumes risk of accidents due to driver's lack of shill
or competence, whether this is known to guest or not).
Under guest statutes, of course, the host does not owe the guest the duty of refraining
from ordinary negligence. This result could also be described in terms of assumption
of risk, viz., that the guest assumes the risk of his host's ordinary negligence.
49. Bogen v. Bogen, 220 N.C. 648, 18 S.F.2d. 162 (1942); Garrity v. Mangan, 232
Iowa 1188, 1193, 6 N.,V.2d. 292, 295 (1942). Cf. Wilson v. Hill, 103 Colo. 409, 413-14, 86
P.2d. 1034, 1087 (1939) (The court, however, carefully limits its remarks to what we
here call assumption of risk in a secondary sense, viz. contributory negligence); Rice,
The Autouwbile Guest & the Ratio;ale of Assumption of Rish, 27 Mnn. L Rmy. 429, 441
(1943); 4 BLASHFIELD, CYcLOPEDIA OF Au0romOBir . L.w.' & Pfu\cricz 716 (perm. ed.
1935).
50. Marks v. Dordn, 105 Conn. 521, 136 At. 83 (1927) ; 4 BLA 5I F.D, CvcaorzmA
OF AuromxoBnx. LAw & PpACrkcE 718 (perm. ed. 1935).
51. Garrity v. Mangan, 232 Iowa 118, 6 N.N.2d 292 (1942); Note, 33 Mica. L.
Rnv. 556 (1940) ; Bl.asanm.n, op. cit. supra note 50, 716.
52. Doggett v. Lacey, 121 Cal. App. 395, 9 P.2d 257 (1932) ; Maybee v. Maybe, 79
Utah 585, 11 P.2d 973 (1932) (near-sighted driver without her glasses); cf. Wilson v.
Hill, 103 Colo. 409, 86 P.2d 1084 (1939).
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who perceives 53 this condition undoubtedly assumes the risks it entails, even if
they should involve wanton misconduct. 4 If, to the guest's knowledge, the
host has some well-defined dangerous habit pattern (such as speeding around
curves) some courts rule that the risks of this habit also are assumed,5
Beyond this there is a line of cases, mainly in Wisconsin," holding that the
host owes the guests only the duty to exercise the degree of skill and experience
which he actually possesses (even though that should fall short of ordinary
reasonable care) and that the guest assumes the risks that come from any
failure to exercise a higher degree of skill (even though such failure would
otherwise amount to negligence) .r These cases, however, draw a distinction
between precautions which only experience would school a man to take, and
those precautions-such as accurate observation, obedience to basic traffic
regulations, etc.-which a reasonable man would take whatever his level of
experience. Any driver owes his guest the duty to take this latter kind of pre-
caution.5s Some dicta woijld make the guest's assumption of risk even broader
53. This perception may come before the guest accepts the ride, or during the ride.
In the latter case the risk is assumed only if there is a reasonable opportunity to terminate
the guest-host relationship, or at least to protest against the risk. Raddant v. Labutzke,
233 Wis. 381, 289 N.W. 659 (1940) ; White, Liability of an Automobile Driver to a Noll-
Paying Passenger, 20 VA. L. Rxv. 326, 354 (1934) ; Note, 154 A.L.R. 924 (1945).
54. Assumption of risk is therefore a defense to an action under the typical guest
statute. White v. McVicker, 216 Iowa 90, 246 N.W. 385 (1933) ; Rice, The Automobile
Guest & the Rationale of Assumption of Risk, 27 MINN. L. Rnv. 429, 452 (1943) ; White,
Liability of an Automobile Driver to a Non-Pa3ing Passenger, 20 VA. L. Rnv, 326,
346-55 (1934).
These cases usually also involve voluntary self-exposure to a known utnreasonable
risk, and therefore the kind of contributory fault that would probably bar an action for
a wanton breach of the duty to use care (e.g. for an action under a guest statute).
Wilson v. Hill, 103 Colo. 409, 86 P.2d 1084 (1939); Donelon v. Wright, 148 Kan. 287,
81 P.2d 50 (1938) ; cf. McMahon v. Schindler, 38 Cal. App. 2d 642, 102 P.2d 378 (1940) ;
Hall v. Meister, 42 Ohio App. 425, 182 N.W. 350 (1932). But the result is often ration-
alized in terms of a limitation on duty. White v. MeVicker, supra, 216 Iowa at 93,
("toward a person fully cognizant and appreciative of a danger-a risk to which the
defendant's conduct exposes him-the defendant has no duty of taking care, and Is
therefore not negligent.") ; Hall v. Hall, 63 S.D. 343, 258 N.W. 491 (1935).
55. Young v. Nunn, Bush & Weldon Shoe Co., 212 Wis. 403, 249 N.W. 278 (1933)
(overtaking traffic on right) ; Olson v. Hermansen, 196 Wis. 614, 220 N.W. 203 (1928)
(speed).
56. See citations of cases in Note, 91 A.L.R. 554 (1934) ; 4 BLAgsnmrD, CYCLOPEDIA
oF AUTOMOBILE LAW & PRacricE § 2512 (perm. ed. 1935).
57. The leading case is Cleary v. Eckart, 191 Wis. 114, 210 N.W. 267, 51 A,L,R.
576 (1926) (inexperience of driver). Other typical cases are Kelly v. Gagnon, 121
Neb. 113, 236 N.W. 160 (1931); Hall v. Hall, 63 S.D. 343, 258 N.W. 491 (1935). In
most cases of this kind it was shown that plaintiff knew the host's degree of experience
and the court mentioned that as though it was a factor of significance. In Wisconsin,
however, the guest's ignorance of limitations upon the driver's experience is immaterial.
Eisenhut v. Eisenhut, 212 Wis. 467, 472, 250 N.W. 441 (1933).
58. Hall v. Hall, 63 S.D. 343, 258 N.W. 491 (1935); Rudolph v. Xetter, 233 Wis.
329, 289 N.Mr. 674 (1940) ; Tietz v. Blaier, 250 Wis. 214, 26 N.W.2d 551 (1947).
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than under the Wisconsin rule by extending it to all the risks from the negli-
gence of a driver known to be negligent. But few decisions go this far 9 and
some dearly repudiate any such result."0 The soundest rule would be that the
guest is bound to anticipate, and so assume, only those future acts of negligence
which are so serious and so likely to happen that the question would be largely
academic whether the guest assumed the risk or needlessly exposed himself to
peril.61
Perhaps the fellow servant rule, once applied in master and servant cases,
represented the assumption of the risks from another's future careless con-
duct.6 2 Perhaps, however, that rule more truly represented an unwillingness
to extend vicarious liability to cases arising within the employer's economic
family.63  At any rate the question is no longer important, for the rule is
dead.64
The Voluntary Character of Assumption of Risk
We have said that the voluntary character of the association between
plaintiff and defendant is the gist of the defense. This needs further elucida-
tion. Plaintiff may voluntarily encounter a risk in one sense, yet not assume
it. An example is the case of the traveler who chooses the more dangerous
59. Except, of course, in states like Massachusetts where the guest assumes the ris!:
of his host's ordinary negligence whether he has reason to anticipate it or not. See note
48 supra.
60. See notes 49 and 50 spra.
61. See, as examples, Young v. Wheby, 126 IV. Va. 741, 30 S.E.2d 6 (1944) and
cases collected in annotation thereto, 154 A.L.R. 924.
This kind of contributory fault (as well as assumption of risk) would probably bar
even an action for wantonness (e.g. under a guest statute). See note 54 supra. If a
rule like that in Wisconsin is adopted, on the other hand, a plaintiff would sometimes ba
barred where his conduct could not fairly be called unreasonable and where dekndant
would be considered negligent to third persons. See, e.g., Olson v. Hermansen, 195
Wis. 614, 220 N.V. 203 (1928). Cf. the analysis of Pinckard v. Pease, 115 Wash. 232,
197 Pac. 49 (1921), in White, The Liability of an Automobile Drk'er to a lon-PaSing
Passenger, 20 VA. L. RLv. 326, 352-3 (1934). Such a result is to be deplored, unless
the policies which have given rise to guest statutes be accepted.
Even if the conclusion in the text is adopted, a distinction between assumption of ris!:
and contributory negligence will have to be made if a comparative negligence statute is
applicable. If the case be analyzed as involving no breach of defendant's duty, then
there would be no liability without regard to any such statute. If defendant's breach of
duty be conceded, then under a comparative negligence statute the effect of voluntary
self-exposure to peril might well be simply to diminish damages. Landrum v. Roddy,
143 Neb. 934, 12 NAV.2d 82 (1943). Cf. I,.LLZ!S, Joner Toavs & Co : uo. ,, NIr.
LIGExcE c. 12 (1951).
62. See Owens v. Union Pacific R.R., 319 U.S. 715, 722 (1942).
63. See Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 H.uv. L. Rzv. 14, 30 (1905).
64. See, e.g. 35 STAT. 65 (1903), as amended 53 ST.AT. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. §51
(1946) (abolished under Federal Employers Liability Act) ; Horovrrz, ILyuny & Dnxni
UNDEP Wo .r=,es CoyPEsATioN Acts 2 ct seq. (1944).
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but shorter route on the highway. 5 On the other hand plaintiff may assume
a risk which in a very real sense he does not voluntarily encounter, as where
a fireman in the line of duty, enters a factory which is dark and full of
dangerous machinery, 66 or where a tenant leases premises in a dangerous
state of disrepair because no other quarters are available."7 The key is to be
found in the character of the relationship between the parties and their
respective duties in the light of it. The plaintiff takes a risk voluntarily
(within the meaning of the present rule) where the defendant has a right to
face him with the dilemma of "take it or leave it"--in other words where
defendant is under no duty to make the conditions of their association any
safer than they appear to be.0 8 In such a case it does not matter that plain-
tiff is coerced to assume the risk by some force not emanating from defendant,
such as poverty,69 dearth of living quarters, 0 or a sense of moral respon-
65. See p. 144 supra.
66. Lunt v. Post Printing & Publishing Co,, 48 Colo. 316, 110 Pac. 203 (1910);
Mulcrone v. Wagner, 212 Minn. 478, 4 N.W.2d 97, 141 A.L.R. 580 (1942); but cf. Melers
v. Fred Koch Brewery, 229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491, 13 A.L.R. 633 (1920); Shypulskl v.
Waldorf Paper Products Co., 232 Minn. 394, 45 N.W.2d 549 (1951), 31 B.U.L. Rnv, 442
(1951).
The situation here referred to is to be distinguished from cases where defendant has
negligently caused the condition calling for rescue (e.g. set the fire). See Liming v.
Illinois Cent. R.R., note 32 supra (bystander). But cf. Suttie v. Sun Oil Co., 15 Pa. D.
& C. 3 (1931); Note, 141 A.L.R. 584 (1942) (as to public firemen). The text deals
simply with the question whether defendant is negligent in failing to prepare a safe
place for firemen.
67. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 356 (1934); O'Malley v. Twenty-Five Associates, 178
Mass. 555, 60 N.E. 387 (1901). Cf. Robbins v. Jones, 15 C.B. (N.S.) 220, 240 (1863)
("fraud apart, there is no law against letting a tumbledown house"); Harkrider, Tort
Liability of a Landlord, 26 MicH. L. REv. 260, 262 (1928).
68. See notes 6-11 supra.
69. This was well pointed up by the early master and servant cases. Thus in Ogden
v. Rummens, 3 F & F 751, 752 (N.P. 1863), a suit by the widow of a workman killed
by the falling of an arch on which he was working, a witness was asked "whether, if
he thought there was danger, he would not have remonstrated about it, he answered that
he certainly might have done so, but that the answer would no doubt have been, 'Well,
if you don't like to do the work, some one else will be glad to do it:' an answer which
the learned JU"GE observed was very sensible."
See also Welsh v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 167 Fed. 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1909);
and ef. Skipp v. The Eastern Counties Ry. Co., 9 Ex. 223, 23 L. J. Ex. 23, 156 Eng.
Rep. 95 (1853) where the same attitude-though not expressly articulated-obviously
underlies the decisions. Later developments in these cases are treated at pp. 155-7, 165
infra. Note, however, that modifications of the earlier attitude have come largely within
the master-servant relationship. If another's employee (e.g. the postman or the delivery-
man) finds the pathway to my home defective, the relationship is still regarded as
voluntary so far as the employee and I are concerned, even though he may be under
economic pressure from his employer (and his circumstances) to encounter the risk I
have faced him with. This does not seem to have been discussed but it is frequently
assumed, as in Paubel v. Hitz, 339 Mo. 274, 96 S.W.2d 369 (1936) (postman); Ft.
Worth & D.C. Ry. Co. v. Hambright, 130 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
70. See note 67 supra.
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sibility.71 If, on the other hand, defendant is not privileged to put plaintiff to
the choice of taking or leaving a danger, the mere posing of the dilemma takes
away the voluntary character of any assumption there may be of the risk.72
So much for theoretical analysis. It will be apparent at once that the whole
spirit of the defense and of the reasoning it employs, bears the strong imprint
of laissez faire and its concomitant philosophy of individualism which has
passed its prime. For the most part it is a product of the same climate of
opinion that gave vitality, for e-ample, to caveat emptor, contributory negli-
gence, and notions of freedom of contract betveen employer and workman.
73
Small wonder then that assumption of risk has lost ground as that climate of
opinion has undergone modification-especially in some relationships like
that of master and servant or landlord and tenant where the change has
gone farthest and the duties of one party to the relationship have been greatly
extended. It is likely to lose more ground as notions of social insurance gain
strength and techniques for effecting broad distribution of enterprise liability
are developed. But it would be a mistake to assume that the notion has lost
all vitality today.74 Perhaps it never will-at least there has been one rela-
tionship (that of host and guest in an automobile) wherein the defendants'
71. The solicitor for the community chest drive or the volunteer fireman, going upon
private premises in the course of his self-imposed duties would be an e-ample. Such a
person would occupy at best the status of an invitee. But see note 11 stipro.
72. See notes 21 and 24 supra.
73. Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Rish, 20 HAIIv. L. Rnv. 14, 91 (1910); Go,;
The Defence of Volenti Non Fit Iniuria, 61 JuRm. R v. 37 (1949).
74. Some courts have declared that they have repudiated assumption of risk save
in master and servant cases. Papakalos v. Shaka, 91 N.H. 265, IS A2I 377 (1941);
Snelling v. Harper, 137 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); cf. Peyla v. Duluth,
Alissabe & Iron Range Ry. Co., 213 Minn. 196, 205, 15 NV2d 51S (1944) ("In other
than master and servant cases, assumption of risk is but a phase of contributory negli-
gence.") From what has been said above it is apparent that every decision which is
based on the rationale of assumption of risk in the primary sense, could equally well
be based on reasoning from the lack of defendant's duty. And not only vill the decision
be the same in either case but so will be the essential reasoning (though not all the
verbiage). So it is not surprising to find that the courts in question do not actually
come to conclusions in concrete cases any different from those which are reastned in
terms of assumption of risk-all that is repudiated is a form of words. Cook v. 177 Granite
St., Inc., 95 N.H. 397, 64 A.2d 327 (1949) (licensee); Keys v. Alamo City Baseball Co.,
150 S.W.2d 368 (Te. Civ. App. 1941) (spectator at ball game); Ft. Worth % D.C.
R. Co. v. Hambright, 130 S.W.2d 436 (Te.:. Civ. App. 1939) (invitee); McGregor,
Incurred Risk in Texas, 1 BA.YLor L. REv. 410 (1949); Keeton, Assumption of Ri1s1: &
the Landowner, 20 Tax. L. REv. 562 (1942). Compare Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. V.
Thornley, 127 F.2d 128, 133 (10th Cir. 1942) ("The defense of assumption of ris! is not
available in Oklahoma between parties not in a contractual relationship") with City of
Tulsa v. Harman, 148 Old. 117, 299 Pac. 462 (1931) (stating broadly the usual rule
that invitee on land assumes the risk of perfectly obvious dangers there). Perhaps,
however, the repudiation is helpful to clarity of thought because of the ambiguities that
lurk in the term assumption of risk.
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duties have been cut down rather than expanded in the last quarter century.6
At any rate, for present purposes it remains to consider the application of
assumption of risk to specific types of situations, and to sketch very briefly
whatever trends may be observable in connection with them.
Master and Servant
Apparently the doctrine came to full recognition in actions brought by
workmen against their employers for injuries incurred at work.70 The early
attitude was clear and led quite naturally and logically to the concept of
assumption of risk. This was very simply expressed by a Scottish court in
a case where the workman was injured by a horse whose dangerous tendencies
he knew (and of which he had complained). "This is a country of free
labour. We have no such thing as travaux forcds, still less have we anything
approaching slavery.... Now, if a servant, in the face of a manifest danger,
chooses to go on with his work, he does so at his own risk, and not at the
risk of his master."'  As the Supreme Court has recently pointed out,
assumption of risk developed in response to the general impulse of common-
law courts "to ,insulate the employer as much as possible from bearing the
'human overhead' which is an inevitable part of the cost-to someone-of
the doing of industrial business." Any other rule "would not only subject
employers to unreasonable and often ruinous responsibilities, thereby em-
barrassing all branches of business" but would also "encourage carelessness
on the part of the employee."' 8
This, of course, is almost the exact antithesis of the philosophy which
underlies workmen's compensation acts. That regards the toll of industrial
accident as an inevitable, though reducible, cost of our industrial and economic
system and compensates the victim without regard to fault on the part of
anyone, distributing the cost of compensation among the beneficiaries of the
enterprise that takes the toll. Under such a system the risks of injury are
put directly upon industry-there is no room for their assumption by the
75. Weber, Guest Statutes, 11 U. CIN. L. REv. 24 (1937); MALcoLmu, Au OMOBIr
GUEST LAW (1937).
76. LABA'rT, COMMNARIES ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT §§ 1167 et Seq
(2d.ed 1913) ; Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 HARv. L. Rnv. 14, 91 (1910) ;
Warren, Volenti Non Fit Injuria in Actions of Negligence, 8 HARV. L. Rtv. 457 (1895).
77. Crichton v. Keir, 1 Sess. Cas. [Scot.] (3d series) 407, 410-11 (1863).
78. Black, J., in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 59 (1943) quoting
Mr. Justice Bradley in Tuttle v. Detroit, Grand Haven & Milwaukee Ry., 122 U.S. 189
(1887). In his thoughtful treatise, Labatt states that it was only by an "accident of
litigation" that the early cases on this subject attacked the problem of employer's liability
from the point of view of the servant's assumption of risks rather than that of the
master's duty which might fairly have been regarded as one "to be held responsible if
. . . conditions [of work] are not such as a prudent man would maintain under the
circumstances." This accident of birth produced an "intolerably severe doctrine" which
has led to much conflict and confusion. See 3 LABATT, COMMENTARIES ON TIE LAW
OF MASTER & SERVANT §§ 893, 1181 (2d ed. 1913) (hereinafter cited as LAnArr).
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employee.7 9 Between the early cases and the advent of workmen's compensa-
tion there emerged, at least in England, a growing recognition of the reality
of the forces which pretty much coerced a workman to continue in one em-
ployment or another with its various attendant dangers. As one judge
succinctly put it, it was "his poverty, not his will" which consented.5P An-
other pointed out that "freedom of choice predicates, not only full kmowledge
of the circumstances on which the exercise of choice is conditioned, so that
he may be able to choose wisely, but the absence from his mind of any feeling
of constraint so that nothing shall interfere with the freedom of his will."'13
This change of attitude was accompanied by many inroads upon the defense.
The story of this development has been ably told elsewhere 2 But for present
purposes in America it is sufficient to note: (1) that nearly all industrial
accidents are covered by workmen's compensation statutes;S3 (2) that the
largest single area where that is not so (injuries to railroad employees en-
gaged in interstate commerce and to seamen) is covered by a statute which
since 1939 has abolished the defense of assumption of risk ;84 (3) that there
79. A summary of the report of the Wainwright Commission which recommended
the original New York Workman's Compensation Law appears in Ives v. South
Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N.Y. 271, 284-7, 94 N.E. 431, 434-6 (1911). See also 1 Scn-.mzn,
WoaxmxN's COMPENSATION c. 1 (perm. ed. 1941); Honovrrz, I,juny & D.ATu
UxNER WoIR=N's COmPENSATION LAWS 1-10 (1944); Ho~NzoLD, A. Tn=TrsE os.
THE AmEnicAx & ENGLISHr WORMxE's CompE:NsATioN LAws §§ 1-5 (1917).
80. Hawkins, J., in Thrussell v. Handyside, 20 Q.B.D. 359, 364 (1897).
81. Scott, L. J. in Bowalter v. Rowley Regis Corp. [1944] 1 K.B. 476, 479.
82. See, e.g., Gow, The Defense of Volenti Non Fit Injuria, 61 Junxn. R.M 37 (1949).
83. All the states, Alaska, the District of Columbia and Hawaii have worlmen's
compensation laws. Federal legislation of this character covers many employees of the
federal government and of federal agencies, and also longshoremen and harbor workers.
While coverage under these acts is not complete, the excluded classes of employees are
for the most part those in domestic service, in agriculture, or in the service of those
employing labor on a very small scale. The complete text of all Statutes is to be found
in SCHNEIDER, WoRKmEN's COMPENSATIOx STATUTES (1939) and current supplements
thereto.
See also note 130 infra.
84. 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1946) (railroad employees) made applicable
to Seamen by 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 6S (1946) ; Becker v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 179 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1950); Cf. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S.
424 (1939).
As we shall see (notes 86-93 infra), assumption of risk had come to have a dual
aspect in master and servant cases, viz. (1) assumption of the ordinary risks of employ-
ment which the master was not bound to protect the servant against, but the servant had
to protect himself against, and (2) assumption of risks created by the negligence of the
master (but known to and appreciated by the servant). The amendment w,,as therefore
open to the possible construction that only the second kind of assumption of risk was
abolished. The first kind, being simply the negation of negligence, was not affected,
for negligence was still the basis of liability under the Act. This possible construction
of the amendment was adopted by some courts and by Frankfurter, J., in Tiller v.
Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 63 et seq. (1943) (concurring opinion). Cf.
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 128 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1942).
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are a few areas not covered by the above-mentioned statutes (such as agri.
cultural, or domestic labor in some states) where the defense still exists;86
(4) where it does, the American cases do not reflect to any appreciable extent
the developments which have marked the last century of English law, though
they should.
The conventional statement of the rule in America today is that the servant
"cassumes (1) such dangers as are ordinarily and normally incident to the work,
and a workman of mature years is presumed to know them whether he does
or not; (2) such extraordinary and abnormal risks as he (a) knows and appre-
ciates and faces without complaint or (b) are obvious and apparent."80 Ordi-
nary risks are sometimes defined as those existing after the master has done
all he is bound to do for the safety of the servant, 7 but this is not helpful for
it does not tell us what the master is bound to do. A better definition of ordinary
risk is one which is "so regularly and normally incident to the employment that
anyone who considers the matter at all must see that the liability to
It did not, however, prevail. The majority of the Supreme Court held that "every
vestige of the doctrine of assumption of risk was obliterated." Tiller v. Atlantic Coast
Line Ry. Co., vupra, at 58.
What this means in effect is that the whole structure of reciprocal rights and duties
has been shifted. Where the old law cast the burden of self-protection on the employee,
the new dispensation puts the burden of exercising care for the protection of each
employee on the railroad, so far as compensation for injuries goes. The employer
must now take reasonable precautions against foreseeable sources of injury to em-
ployees even where those sources include inadvertence or oversight by the employee
himself. The master's duty is no longer fulfilled by making the conditions of employment
as safe as they appear to be; he must use care to make them reasonably safe. This
is not, as Frankfurter suggests, an abrogation of negligence as the basis of liability.
A main vice of assumption of risk in the older cases was that it limited the duties
of employers far more drastically than would the ordinary canons of negligence. The
books are full of cases (outside the master-servant sphere) where a defendant has been
held negligent for failing to take some precaution to protect a plaintiff against a danget
that plaintiff could have himself avoided if he had looked out for it. The com-
mon law often put one party to a relationship under the primary duty to use care
to protect the other from injury (relieving the former of liability only when the other
was negligent in "assuming the risk"). All the situations listed above (at notes 16-28)
are of that kind and it would have been quite natural and logical for master and servant
cases to take the same course. See LABATT, § 1181; note 78 supra.
The amendment has expanded the duties of defendants very greatly beyond what
they were before. But they still all lie within the obligation to use due care under the
circumstances. There will still be no liability, even for the risks of railroading, unless
reasonable foresight by the employer could have prevented them by reasonable means,
Cf. Roberts v. United Fisheries V. Co., 141 F.2d 288 (1st Cir.), cert. den,, 323 U.S. 753
(1944).
85. ScHNEmER, op. cit. supra, note 79, § 626 et seq. Cf. Kruzan v. Grace, 165 Kan.
638, 198 P.2d 154 (1948), 1 BAYLOR L. REv. 489 (1949).
86. Boatman v. Miles, 27 Wyo. 481, 487, 199 Pac. 933, 26 A.L.R. 864 (1921);
LA ATr, § 1186 a.
87. Boatman v. Miles, supra note 86.
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be injured by such an occurrence is an ever-present possibility." 63 Against
these risks the servant must protect himself; the master is bound to
afford him no protection.80 Extraordinary risks, on the other hand, are said
to be those attributable to the master's negligence. 0' And if the master be
regarded as under certain duties of care with respect to works, ways, and
appliances to all employees, then the defense of assumption of risk may in this
instance be interposed successfully to a defendant's negligence. Most of these
cases, however, are susceptible of a different explanation, namely that there
is no absolute or intrinsic duty or negligence to all employees, and a servant's
knowledge of the risk is not a defense but a factor to be considered in determin-
ing whether the master is negligent towrards him. "As regards a servant who
fully understands the perils to which an instrumentality exposes him, it is not
negligence to furnish or continue to use that instrumentality, however defective
and dangerous it may be.""' Under this view the master's duty w:ith respect
to extraordinary risks is like that of an occupier of ordinary private land
towards invitees: not an absolute one to use care to make conditions reasonabix
safe, but one that will be satisfied if conditions are made as safe as they appear
to be.92 This analysis minimizes the theoretical difference between ordinary
and extraordinary risks. Under any view, however, there is a distinction for
the purposes of trial practice. "[T]he servant's knowledge of the risk must
always be established by specific evidence where the risk is abnormal, but will
frequently be presumed where the risk is normal.!'"
In situations where there would otherwise be assumption of risk, it may be
avoided by showing that the master had promised to remedy the dangerous
conditions and that a sufficient time had not elapsed to warn the servant that
the promise would not be kept.94 Under some circumstances, also, an assur-
ance of safety by the master will have the same effect.
Other Situations
In the case of the gratuitous licensee on land, assumption of risk still holds
full sway so far as condition of the premises goes, though the result is more
often rationalized in terms of vant of duty. This at least is the announced
8E. LABA r, § 1169 at 3112; Baer v. Baird Mach. Co., 84 Conn. 269, 79 AtI. 673 (1911).
89. Johnson v. Devoe Snuff Co. 62 NJL 417, 41 At. 936 (1S93); I-LAur, § 1167.
90. Hough v. Texas & P.R.R., 100 U.S. 213 (1879) ; L,,ATr, § 1178.
91. LABATT, § 952 at 2564. Cf. Taft, J., in Narramore v. C.C & St. L. Ry. Co., 95
Fed. 298, 301 (6th Cir. 1899).
92. Guedelhofer v. Ernsting, 23 Ind. App. 188, 55 N.E. 113 (1899); Marsh v. Chicl-
ering, 101 N. Y. 396, 5 N.E. 56 (1886) ; LiAtrT, § 953.
93. LABarr, § 955 at 2573.
Where the workman is a minor, or handicapped, even this difference disappears, the
master having the burden of showing comprehension of even ordinary risks. Fisl: v.
Central Pac. Ry. Co., 72 Cal. 38, 13 Pac. 144, 1 Am. St. Rep. 22 (1887) ; LA.,Tr, § 1203.
94. Gunning System v. Lapointe, 212 Ill. 274, 72 N.E. 393, (1904) ; LA.uArr, § 1349
et seq.
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doctrine.05 The licensee takes the premises as he finds them. The owner or
possessor is not bound to inspect them or make them safe, but only to disclose
concealed conditions of danger of which he actually knows. It would be a mis-
take to conclude that there has been no extension of liability here, but develop-
ments have been less radical and less widespread and well within the framework
of existing doctrine. This deserves separate treatment, but a few points may
be noted here. (a) There has been some tendency to liberalize the test of a
concealed danger-it was once said "an open hole, which is not covered other-
wise than by the darkness of night, is a danger which a licensee must avoid at
his peril." 6 Today the test is generally whether the licensee might be expected
to discover the danger by using reasonable caution.97 (b) There has been
greater readiness to find the plaintiff an invitee rather than a "bare licensee.""
(c) There has been considerable astuteness in finding affirmative negligent
conduct rather than a mere condition of the premises. 0 (d) These develop-
ments have been most noticeable where premises have been prepared for the
entry of more or Jess unidentified segments of the public.1 10 (e) Orthodox
95. See note 10 supra.
HApRn, LAW OF TORTS § 95 (1933); PROSSER, TORTS § 78 (1941); RESTATEMENT,
ToRTs § 342 (1934).
96. Holmes, J., in Reardon v. Thompson, 149 Mass. 267, 268, 21 N.E. 369 (1889).
Cf. Moffatt v. Kenny, 174 Mass. 311, 54 N.E. 850 (1899).
97. Deacy v. McDonnell, 131 Conn. 101, 38 A.2d 181 (1944) ; Recreation Centre
Corp. v. Zimmerman, 172 Md. 309, 191 Atl. 233 (1937); Hashim v. Chimiklis, 91 N.H.
456, 21 A.2d 166 (1941) ; cf. The Blue Moon III, 60 F.2d 653 (W.D.N.Y. 1932).
98. Robey v. Keller, 114 F.2d 790 (4th Cir. 1940); Guilford v. Yale University,
128 Conn. 449, 23 A.2d 917 (1942) ; Dym v. Merit Oil Co., 130 Conn. 585, 36 A.2d 276
(1944); Mercer v. Tremont & G. R. Co., 19 So.2d 270 (La. App. 1944); Melers v.
Fred Koch Brewery, 229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491 (1920); Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 235
S.W.2d 609 (Tex. 1950). But ef. Laube v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469, 78 A.2d 693 (1951)
and Discussion, 25 CONN. B.j. 123 (1951); Brosnan v. Koufman, 294 Mass. 495, 2
N.E.2d 441 (1936).
See also Bohlen, Duty of a Landowner Towards Those Entering His Prentises of
Their Own Right, 69 U. OF PA. L. REv. 142, 237, 340 (1921) ; Prosser, Busitess Visitors
& Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REv. 573 (1942); Harper, Licensor-Licensec: Tweedleduins
Tweedledee, 25 CoNN. B.J. 123 (1951); Notes, 1 DEPAUL L. REV. 130 (1951), 22 TrxAs
L. REv. 489 (1944) ; SHiJLMAN & JAMES, CASES & MATERIALS ONr ToRTs 506-10 (1942);
RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 332, comments c and d (1934).
99. Ward v. Avery, 113 Conn. 394, 155 Atl. 502 (1931); Carbone v. Mackehil
Realty Corp., 270 App. Div. 778, 59 N.Y.S.2d 529 (3d Dep't 1946), rev'd, 296 N.Y.
154 (1947); Weimer v. Westmoreland W. Co., 127 Pa. Super. 201, 193 At. 665 (1937),
commented on in ELDREDGE, MODERN TORT PROBLEmS 194-5 (1941); Gulf Ref, Co. v.
Beane, 133 Texas 157, 127 S.W.2d 169 (1939); annotation, 20 A.L.R. 202 (1922) ; Sinu-
MAN & JAMES, CASES & MATERIALS ON TORTS 511-2 (1942).
100. Ward v. Avery, 113 Conn. 394, 155 Atl. 502 (1931); Recreation Centre Corp.
v. Zimmerman, 172 Md. 309, 191 Atl. 233 (1937); Carlisle v. J. Weingarten Inc., 137
Texas 220, 152 S.W.2d 1073 (1941), reversing 120 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938);
Note 17 TEXAS L. Rzv. 503 (1939); Prosser, Business Visitors & Invitees, 26 MINN.
L. REv. 573 (1942).
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notions have retained their greatest practical vigor in the case of ordinary
private premises (homes, farms, and the like), or those parts of business and
industrial premises not prepared or generally intended for the reception of
outsiders.:1
The matter as between borrower and gratuitous lender of a chattel stands
in pretty much the same way-though perhaps subtle extensions of liability
are even less perceptible here. The lender's only duty is to disclose defects in
the chattel which he knows about and which the borrower probably will not
notice. All other defects the borrower assumes, whether he could have dis-
covered them or not.'0 2 The rule is the same for the similar case where a
plaintiff accepts gratuitous use of the chattel. The typical situation is one where
plaintiff is a guest in defendant's automobile and is hurt when a defect in the
automobile causes an accident.10 3
Even the business visitor or invitee on ordinary private premises assumes
the risk of dangers which he knows about and fully comprehends or wlich are
sufficiently obvious. To be sure the owner or occupier of land owes to such
an entrant the duty of reasonable inspection (a duty not owed to the gratuitous
licensee), but once he finds the defect he fulfills all further duty to the invitee
by making full disclosure.10 4
Voluntary participants in lawful games, sports, and even roughhouse, assume
the risk of injury at the hands of their fellow participants (and of course of
"hurting themselves"), so long as the game is played in good faith and without
negligence. 0  Voluntary spectators generally assume the same risks, though
101. Laube v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469, 78 A.2d 693 (1951); Prosser, Business Vis-
itors & Invitees, 26 MixN. L. REv. 573 (1942) ; Seavey, Note, 25 Co.m B.J. 133 (1951).
But cf. Mitchell v. Legarsky, 95 N.H. 214, 60 A.2d 136 (1948).
102. See note 9 supra.
103. Higgins v. Mason, 255 N.Y. 104, 174 N.E. 77 (1930); Galbraith v. Busch,
267 N.Y. 230, 196 N.E. 36 (1935); see Dickerson v. Connecticut Co., 93 Conn. 87, 90,
118 At. 518, 519 (1922).
This is to be distinguished from the case where plaintiff is injured by the driver's
negligence. Here the common law doctrine of assumption of risk vas not generally
applied. Dickerson v. Connecticut Co., supra; Rice, The Automobile Guest & the Rationale
of Assumption of Risk, 27 Mlmi. L. REv. 429 (1943); authorities cited supra, note 75..
Guest statutes have, however, in many states cut the host's duty dovm belov, that of using
ordinary care and so may be said to require the guest to assume the risk of ordinary
negligence. Cf. note 48 supra.
104. See authorities cited note 11 supra.
105. McAdams v. Windham, 203 Ala. 492, 94 So. 742 (1922) (friendly sparring
match); Walsh v. Machlin, 128 Conn. 412, 23 A.2d 156 (1941) (golf-ball shanked and
sliced at 900 angle); Thomas v. Barlow, 133 At. 203 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1927), noted 26
MIcir. L. REv. 322 (1928) (basketball); Benjamin v. Nernberg, 102 Pa. Super. 471,
157 AtI. 10 (1931), 16 MiNN. L. REv. 451 (1932) (golf-ball hooked into another fair-
way). Golf cases are collected in Note, 138 A.L.R. 541 (1942).
Compare the similar but distinct problem whether consent to an illegal event (e.g. prize
fight) bars recovery. Bohlen, Consent as Affecting Cizi1 Liability, 24 CoL. L. REV. 819
(1924); Notes, 23 So. CAL.a. L. REv. 135 (1949), 2 V. -m. L REv. 301 (1949).
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other elements enter the situation where a paying spectator sues the proprietor
who has "invited" him to watch the game.
Many of the situations described above do not typically involve the " 'human
overhead' which is an inevitable part of the cost-to someone-of the doing
of industrial business."'106 They could not so appropriately be brought under
a scheme of "enterprise liability.' 07 Perhaps they are an inevitable cost of
life just as are accidents in one's own home. This has always been so, and
the parties directly concerned are often individuals who would have to pay
damages out of their own pockets-much as was the case in 1800. Coticepts
of fault and individualism are therefore, perhaps, less unrealistic here than in
so much of modem accident law, so we may expect them to persist longer and
with fuller vigor. There is one factor that may change this. Liability insurance
is already available to protect the individual against all the risks described.105
As yet it is not very widely held. As it becomes more so, these situations will
become very much like that in automobile accident cases so far as techniques
for distributing the loss are concerned, though the accident toll-hence the
social problem of the uncompensated victim-is much smaller.
There are situations, however, where the injury caused may more appro-
priately be thought of as a casualty incident to a profitable kind of business
enterprise which is (or should be) equipped to make a regular and equitable
distribution of the costs of that enterprise among its beneficiaries according to
the principles of insurance. Where that is the case, both the compensatory and
the admonitory 0 9 functions of tort law are more likely to be furthered by the
imposition of liability. And the actual decisions are likely to reflect that fact,
though the formal legal doctrine may make no distinction between cases involv-
ing neighbor and neighbor, and cases where the risks of an enterprise are
concerned. Such a distinction is attempted here and what follows is a discus-
sion of cases of the latter type.
Where the owner or occupier of land has prepared part of his premises for
the reception of the public or some segment of it, there is coming to be increas-
ing question whether the duty to his invitees is satisfied by simply making
dangerous conditions obvious. There is a tendency towards holding the pro-
prietor to the duty of care to make such premises reasonably safe (a duty
In the Note to the Barlow case, supra, it is said that "in cases arising out of athletic
contests, recovery for negligence seems almost out of the question," but this certainly
is not true of the golf cases.
As to voluntary spectators, see POLLOCK, TORTS 127 (14th ed. 1939); ci. Douglas v.
Converse, 248 Pa. 232, 93 Atli. 955 (1915).
106. See note 78 supra.
107. The phrase is Ehrenzweig's. EHRENZwEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951).
108. Comprehensive Liability Policies are written which will cover the risks referred
to in this paragraph. See, e.g., James, Accident Liability Reconsidercd: The Im1pact o
Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 556, n.21 (1948).
109. That is so because business enterprises-particularly large ones-are strategically
placed to promote accident prevention. James & Dickinson, Accident Proneness & Acci.
dent Law, 63 HARv. L. Rav. 769 (1950).
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similar to that of e.g., municipalities with respect to highways). 1 0 To the
extent that this tendency becomes realized, it will squeeze assumption of risk out
of these cases. But this has not fully happened yet and most statements of the
rule draw no distinction between the duties of the tenant of a house in the
suburbs and the owner of a department store."1' At any rate, however, the
invitee in the cases now under discussion may as a matter of fact make many
assumptions as to safety that would be entirely unreasonable in the case of an
invitee on ordinary private property. Iany dangers which would be "obvious"
(hence assumed) in the latter case will not be so in the former. Thus a cus-
tomer in a store may to a certain extent assume that the aisles are free from
obstructions and pitfalls and that he is free to give some ttention to the mer-
chandise on the counters and other displays as he walks along.11
2
The group of cases in this field where assumption of risk has most frequently
been invoked involves spectators at games. Ordinarily, for example, only the
part of the baseball grandstand behind home plate is screened, and quite a few
cases have occurred where spectators in the unscreened portion of the stands
have been injured by batted or thrown balls. The courts have held that there
is no negligence in this kind of arrangement and that the spectator takes the
risk of these incidents.113 He does not, however, assume the risk of injury
from such things as defective screening or negligence in allowing batting prac-
tice too near the stands.1 4 Hockey stands also often have screened (behind
the goals) and unscreened portions, and here too a spectator may be hit by a
flying puck. An experienced spectator no doubt assumes this risk, but in the
case of one not familiar with the game and this risk, courts are divided." 5
110. Cases which seem to exemplify this trend are Hodge v. Weinstockt L. & Co.,
109 CaL App. 393, 293 Pac. 80 (1930); Delmore v. Polinsky, 132 Conn. 23, 42 A.2d
349 (1945); Johnson v. Pulidy, 116 Conn. 443, 165 Ad. 355 (1933); Johnson v. Rulon,
363 Pa. 585, 70 A.2d 325 (1950); ,algreen-Texas Co. v. Shivers, 137 Temas 493, 154
S.W.2d 625 (1941). See Malone, Contributory Negligence & the Landowner Cases,
29 M6Im-. L. REv. 61, 83, 87 (1945) ; James, Accident Liability: Sone Wartime DCerel-
opizents, 55 YATr L.J. 365, 385 (1946) ; Comment, 22 TrxAs L. Rsv. 489 (1944).
111. The Restatement, for instance, states the same rule for business visitors, vihether
in homes or stores. RESTATEmmT, TOaTs § 343 (1934). But cf. note 112 infra.
And contrast such a case as 'Blodgett v. B. H. Dyas & Co., 4 CaL 2d 511, 50 P2d
801 (1935), with those in note 110 supra.
112. See authorities cited supra note 110; RESTATEM.ENT, ToRs §343, comment e
(1934).
There is an illuminating discussion of the extent to which a highway traveler may
assume conditions of safety, and a comparison of his lot with that of a store's customer,
in McFarlane v. Niagara Falls, 247 N.Y. 340, 160 N.E. 391 (1928). The issue there
was contributory negligence but, as the text suggests, the same considerations have a
direct bearing on the amount of care which will be reasonable for the defendant.
113. See notes 44 and 46 supra.
114. Grimes v. American League B. Co., 78 S.W.2d. 520 (Mfo. App. 1935); Cin-
cinnati B. Co. v. Eno, 112 Ohio 175, 147 N.E. 86 (1925), 20 Iu.. L Rv., 734 (1926),
24 Mica. L. Rr-v. 76 (1925); Comment, 24 CAwn. L. REv. 429 (1936).
115. See notes 46 and 47 supra.
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Probably lack of experience would make no difference in the baseball cases, 110
but there may well be a difference between the obviousness of the risk and the
universality of popular knowledge of it that would warrant different treatment
of the proprietor's duties in the two cases. These decisions make sense tinder
a fault principle of liability, but there is here a most appropriate basis for
enterprise liability.
Another relationship in which the notion of assumption of risk has been
applied is that between landlord and tenant with respect to the leased premises
themselves (as distinguished from common hallways, approaches, and the
like, which remain in the landlord's control). Here, traditionally, the land-
lord's only duty ws to disclose concealed dangers known to him; other
dangers the tenant assumes. Apart from statute, this is still the rule. But
being a landlord is engaging in a business enterprise, though often a very
small one. And in many periods of our very recent-and contemporary-
history, housing shortages have drastically limited free choice on the part
of tenants and put them, as a class, in a disadvantageous bargaining position.
It is not surprising, therefore, that there has been an increasing number of
statutes requiring landlords to put and keep leased premises in a given state
of repair, or to take other precautions looking in part towards the safety
of their tenants.1 11 Where statutes impose such duties, a tenant does not
assume the risk of their breach.118
Express Assumption of Risk
So far we have been discussing what may loosely be termed implied assump-
tion of risk. Often, it will be noted, this involves nothing that could very
realistically be called an agreement even by implication. Rather it represents
a consequence that the law attaches to various voluntary relationships-a
limitation of the duty owed by one party towards another with respect to the
risks incident to that association. And very often the parties enter into such
a relationship when one (or both) of them does not have these risks or duties
in mind at all. But such parties may make an express agreement concerning
these risks, and this agreement may seek to change the reciprocal rights and
duties that the law would otherwise attach to the relationship.
What we are concerned with here are agreements by one party to assume
the risk of what would ordinarily be a breach of duty by the other.110 Thus
a warehouseman and a bailor may stipulate that the warehouseman shall not
be liable for any damages caused to the goods by water, steam, or fire. Or
a private carrier for hire which has only a defective vehicle available may
116. See note, 46 supra.
117. Annis v. Britton, 232 Mich. 291, 205 N.W. 128 (1925); Altz v. Leiberson, 233
N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922), 7 CoRN. L. Q. 386 (1922); Note, 93 A.L.R. 778 (1934).
118. Eckert v. Reichardt, 243 N.Y. 72, 152 N.E. 469 (1926).
119. This duty is usually to exercise reasonable care, but it may be higher, as in
the case of common carriers of freight.
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agree to carry an urgent passenger only if he will assume the risk of the
vehicle's defect. In such cases the questions may arise (1) whether the
agreement is valid, and (2) whether it is to be construed so as to cover
the risk which caused the injury. In the warehouseman's case, for instance,
there might be a question whether the clause exculpated him from loss by
fire caused by his own negligence.
There is no general legal prohibition against express agreements to assume
risks. 2 0 Specific agreements may however be invalid as against public policy
because of the character of one of the parties or of the relationship' 2 between
them, or because the gravity of the risk is out of all proportion to the utility
of creating it. In the highly individualistic atmosphere of the nineteenth
century, when unbridled freedom of contract was considered a paramount
social good and individuals i all sorts of diverse circumstances were more
apt to be regarded as fully able to protect themselves against the vicissitudes
of the system, this area of prohibition was pretty small.2- Even then it was
recognized. Persons who had undertaken one of the common callings, for
instance, were not altogether free to cut down their duties below those which
the law required of the calling.2 3 As individualism has become more bridled
120. Maying v. Todd, 4 Camp. 225 (N.P. 1815) ; New Jersey S.N. Co. v. Merchants'
Bank, 6 How. 343 (U.S. 1848); Graves v. Davis, 235 N.Y. 315, 139 N.E. 2M0 (1923);
Kirshenbaum v. Gen. Outdoor A. Co., 258 N.Y. 489, 180 N.E. 245 (1932); Grifilths
v. Broderick, Inc., 27 Wash. 2d 901, 182 P.2d 18 (1947); RrsTATC mr.-T, Co:;.-mcrs
§574 (1932). There is an exhaustive collection of cases on this whole subject in
Note, 175 A.L.R. 8 (1948).
Occasionally it has been stated broadly that clauses exculpating a party from liability
for his own negligence are void as against public policy. See Papakalos v. Shalm, 91
N.H. 265, 268, 18 A.2d 377, 379 (1941). But see Nashua G. & C. P. Co. v. Noyes
Buick Co., 93 N.H. 348, 351, 41 A.2d 920, 922 (1945).
121. This is the way the rule is usually expressed. It has been suggested that it
would be more accurate to say that the social reason for preserving the incidents of
the relationship outweight the desirability of allowing parties full freedom of contract.
Note, 37 Coi. L. Rnv. 248 (1937). This is most apt to be the case where there is
great disparity between the bargaining positions of the parties.
122. See, e.g., Mfaving v. Todd, 4 Camp. 225 (N.P. I815) ; New Jersey S.N. Co. v.
Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 343, 381-5 (U.S. 1848); II. Cent. R. Co. v. Morrison, 19
Ill- 136 (1857); Gashweiler v. Wabash St. L. & P.r.Co., 83 Mo. 112 (184); Bissell
v. N.Y. Cent R. Co., 25 N.Y. 442 (1862); Note 175 A.L.-R 8, 110 ct seq. (1943).
123. Cole v. Goodwin, 19 Wend. 251 (N.Y. 18); Gould v. Hill, 2 Hill 623
(N.Y. 1842); Jones v. Voorhees, 10 Ohio 145 (1840); Fish v. Chapman, 2 Ga. 349
(1847); McClain, Contractual Limitation of Liability for Aregligence, 28 HAn%,. L. R '.
550 (1951); Hathe, Limitation of Carriers' Cominon Law Liability in Bills of Ladirg,
8 VA. L. REG. 849 (1903).
The English courts came to uphold limitations of liability (usually to E5) made by
general notice by a carrier, when they were coupled with an option to obtain full inurance
by paying a higher rate. Such limitations were construed as not relieving the carrier
from liability for gross negligence or -wilfulness, but only from his strict liability as
insurer. Smith v. Home, 8 Taunt. 144 (C.P. l18); New.born v. Just, 2 Carr. & P.
76 (N.P. 1825); Riley v. Home, 5 Bing. 217 (C. P. 1828).
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and regulated, in what has come to be thought the paramount general interest,
this area of prohibition has naturally been extended,
More and more relationships are seen to involve inequality in bargaining
powers. Thus today courts are becoming increasingly reluctant to allow
public utilities, professional bailees (e.g. warehousemen), and employers to
exculpate themselves by contract from liability for damage caused by their
own negligence to patrons, bailors, and employees, respectively.
12"
The courts have also shown a marked tendency towards construing excul-
patory clauses strictly, even where they may be valid. Many courts, for
instance, have held in effect that a clause will not be construed to include an
exemption for negligence unless it does so in the clearest terms, as by using
the word "negligence," or language so broad ind sweeping that it must be
taken to include neligence.1
25
In the American cases cited above the courts were loath to give even this much
liberty of contract to the carrier. But Cf. New Jersey S.N. Co. v. Merchants' Bank,
6 How. 343, 381-5 (U.S. 1848). Subsequent American decisions were not harmonious,
A measure of uniformity was brought about however by federal legislation and admis-
trative action (1) allowing common carriers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce
to make differential charges according to the declared value of goods shipped in such
commerce and enforcing the agreed valuations even in cases of negligence, Adamls
Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491 (1913) ; Galveston H. & A. Ry. Co. v. Woodbury,
234 U.S. 357 (1920), and (2) permitting telegraph companies to limit their liability
for mistakes in transmitting unrepeated messages in interstate and foreign commerce and
to charge higher rates for repeated messages. Western Union T. Co. v. Esteve Bros. &
Co., 256 U. S. 566 (1920). See, however, state court cases collected in Note, 175
.. L.R. 8, 53 et seq. (1948), some of them coming to an opposite conclusion so far as
intra-state messages are concerned.
124. Cases are collected in Notes, 37 CoL. L. REV. 248 (1937), 20 CORN. L. Q. 352
(1935), 4 Mo. L. REv. 55 (1939), 175 A.L.R. 8 (1948).
Some illustrative cases are Collins v. Virginia P & E Co., 204 N.C. 320, 168 S.E.
500 (1933) (electric company); Denver U.T.R. Co. v. Cullinan, 72 Colo. 248, 210 Pac,
602 (1922) and Note, 27 A.L.R. 157 (1923) (owners of parcel checkroom); Agricultural
Ins. Co. v. Constantine, 56 N.E.2d 687, 690 (Ohio App. 1943), aft'd, 144 Ohio 275, 58
N.E.2d 658 (1944) (parking lot owner).
In this field as in that of carriers and telegraph companies, some courts are willig
to enforce agreements for a released valuation where coupled with a lower rate. It has
been .urged that such an option (if the rates are reasonable) gives an artificial equality
to the bargaining position of the parties. Note, 37 COL. L. REv. 248 (1937). See also
note 131 infra.
125. This tendency is not new. In Newborn v. Just, 2 Carr. & P. 76 (N.P, 1825)
defenaTant, a bailee, defended on the ground of a notice that he would not be answerable
for goods above 15 unless they were specially paid for. He argued that since he was
not a common carrier he had the right to stipulate against liability for negligence but
Best, C.J., answered, "Then your client must give distinct notice to that effect: and
if the public were told that he would not be liable either for the negligence of himself
or his servants, he would not have many persons trust him."
Other examples of strict construction may be found in Cairnes v. Hillman Drug Co,,
214 Ala. 545, 108 So. 362 (1926); Kessler v. The Ansonia, 253 N.Y. 453, 171 N.E.




In addition to these common law developments, there is an ever growing
number of specific duties imposed by statutes representing a policy of pro-
tection so peremptory that it will not brook an agreement to assume the risk
of a breach of the statute. Thus where the legislature has required a device
or precaution for the protection of employees in a certain trade,120 where
similar precautions are prescribed in a tenement house law for the protection
of tenants,2 7 where the employment of child labor has been forbidden,2
or the like, the statute has often been either written '1 or construed as pre-
cluding express as well as implied assumption of the risks which a statutory
breach would entail.
Moreover, legislatures as well as courts have increasingly recognized the
pressures which in fact compel people to enter into many relationships which
once were regarded as altogether voluntary. Such a feeling has often crys-
tallized in statutes barring agreements to assume the risks of those relation-
ships. We have seen how railroad workers are no longer barred by implied
assumption of risk; the ex-press assumption of the same risk stands no better.'9
Nor would there be any room for an agreement by a workman to assume risks
covered by workmen's compensation laws.131 And exculpatory clauses in
warehouse receipts have been widely outlawed by statute.1 2
Griffiths v. Broderick, Inc., 27 Wash. 2d 901, 182 P.2d 18 (1947) affords an e.ample
of language so broad that it was held to include defendant's own negligence ("from any
and all loss, damage or injury ... arising from any cause or for any reason vwhatso-
ever."). 27 Wash. 2d at 903, 182 P.2d at 19.
126. See, e.g., Narramore v. C.C.C. & St. L. R. Co., 96 Fed. 298, 302 (6th Cir. 1899);
Welsh v. Barber Asphalt P. Co., 167 Fed. 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1909); 5 LAmArr, MAsrtn,
& SERVANT §§ 1647, 1647a (2d ed. 1913) ; Note, 15 A.L.R. 1380, 1485 (1921).
127. Excellent H Corp. v. Richman, 155 Misc. 257, 279 N.Y. Supp. 537 (N.Y.
Munic. Ct. 1935); Villa Victoria, Inc. v. Fanning, 157 Misc. 2S0, 283 N.Y. Supp. 145)
(App. T. 1st Dep't 1935).
128. See, e.g., Dusha v. Virginia & R.L. Co., 145 Minn. 171, 176 N.W. 43" (1920).
129. As was the Federal Safety Appliance Act, 27 STAT. 532 (1893), 45 U.S.C.
§7 (1946).
130. 35 STAT. 66 (1908), as amended 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. §§54, 55 (1946).
Cf. Philadelphia B. & W.R. Co. v. Schubert, 224 U.S. 603 (1912); Duncan Y. Thompson,
315 U.S. 1 (1942).
131. See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 5000; (Deering, 1943) Coz1n. Gs:a. STAT. § 7455
(1949); N.Y. Woaa ES's ComxENSATiOx LAW, § 32.
132. Section 3 of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act forbids terms in such a
receipt which "in any wise impair [warehouseman's] obligation to exercise that degree of
care in the safe-keeping of the goods entrusted to him which a reasonably careful man
would exercise. . ."
This statute has been widely adopted, (see 3 U.L.A. 6 (Supp. 1950)), and frequently
construed to forbid clauses exempting the warehouseman for his negligence. George v.
Bekins V. & S. Co., 196 P.2d 637 (Cal. App. 1948); Kidd & Co. v. North American
P. Co., 249 Ill. App. 28 (1928); Cameron Compress Co. v. Whiting, 20 S.WN. 527 (Te.
Com. App. 1926).
On the other hand limitations of liability to an agreed valuation where the rate
charged is based on the value of the article have been upheld un!er that section, even
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Occasionally also the courts have felt that some kinds of dangers, or dangers
from some kinds of conduct, are so great, and produce so little social utility,
that an agreement to assume them is invalid. "'The interest of the state in the
safety of the citizen"'133 outweighs in such a case the importance "to society
that men abide by ticket and contract stipulations."'31 4 Thus one who rides
"free" on a railroad pass will be bound by his assumption of the risk of injury
from simple negligence, 35 but not that of injury for wilful or wanton mis-
conduct.
Outside of these growing areas of prohibition, an express agreement to take
certain risks will be upheld. Perhaps it should be noted here that some
writers confine the term "assumption of risk" to those cases where there is a
positive agreement (either express or actually to be implied in fact) to waive
a right of action in cases where "the plaintiff has proved that a presumptive
tort has been committed."'31 6 It might well be a good thing if the courts would
confine their use of the term to such cases, but they do not.
Procedural Aspects
Functions of judge and jury. Here as elsewhere' 37 it is for the court to
determine what rules of law are appropriate to the circumstances of a given
case, and whether those rules impose on the defendant a full duty to use care
towards plaintiff, or only the truncated duty which is the counterpart of
assumption of risk (as the term is used here)."s The court decides, for ex-
where the loss is caused by negligence. Missouri P. R. Co. v. Fuqua, 150 Ark. 145, 233
S.W. 926 (1921); McMullin v. Lyon F.S. Co., 74 Cal. App. 87, 239 Pac. 422 (1925);
Eckel v. Trencher Furs, 191 Misc. 14, 76 N.Y. S.2d 829 (N. Y. Munic. Ct. 1947).
But cf. Healy v. N.Y. Cent. R. Co., 153 App. Div. 516, 138 N.Y. Supp. 287 (3d Dep't
1912) aff'd 210 N.Y. 646, 105 N.E. 1086 (1914) ; Taccetta v. Chauncey Rice & Rogovin,
75 F.Supp. 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
133. Jacobus v. St. Paul & C. R. Co., 20 Minn. 125, 130 (1873).
134. Black, J., dissenting in Francis v. So. Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445, 469 (1948),
135. This is true at least of passes authorized by the (federal) Hepburn Act. Francis
v. So. Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445 (1948). There is, however, excellent reason in the context
of the modern accident problem, to disallow waivers of liability for negligence, and
where the federal law is not thought to govern, there is judicial authority for their
disallowance. Jacobus v. St. Paul & C.R. Co., 20 Minn. 125, 130 (1873); Williams v.
Oregon S. L. R. Co., 18 Utah 210, 54 Pac. 991 (1898) ; see Donnelly v. So. Pac. Co., 18
Cal.2d 863, 866, 118 P.26" 465, 468 (1941).
136. WILLIAM s, JOINT TORTS & CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 295 (1951). See also id at
295-316.
137. See, e.g., James, Functions of Judge & Jury its Negligence Cases, 58 YAILE L.J.
667, 676 (1949).
138. Any doubt there may be, for instance, as to the proposition dealt with in note
25 supra (See article by Keeton, cited therein), would be resolved by the court, as
matter of law. And it has been the courts that have adopted the rules governing the
duties of proprietors in the baseball cases. See notes 44, 46, 47 supra. And notoriously




ample, whether a storekeeper must use care to make his store reasonably safe
for customers or whether his duty is satisfied if dangerous defects are suffi-
ciently obvious. But the application of that rule to the specific facts in evidence
is properly a jury function, subject to the usual limit that a jury verdict may not
stand if it necessarily involves a finding that the court believes reasonable men
could not make. Thus in the storekeeper's case the jury would decide whether
the claimed defect existed and was dangerous, and also whether it w;as obvi-
ous.139 Here, as elsewhere in the law of negligence, the courts have probably
exercised an increasing restraint over their own function so as to enlarge the
jury's sphere of decision. 40
Pleading and burden of proof. Assumption of risk has come to be thought
of as a defense and as time has progressed a disfavored defense. 14 ' Modern
books are full of statements that the burden of pleading and proving assumption
of risk is upon the defendant.1' And in many of the ways in which the term is
used, this is undoubtedly the general rule. Where, for instance, defendant
claims that plaintiff has expressly agreed to w-aive a liability whfich would
(except for the agreement) exist, defendant would have to make that claim
good by affirmative pleading and proof.'4 3 And where the phrase "assumption
of risk" is used to refer to contributory negligence-plaintiff's unreasonable
assumption of a risk defendant is bound not to put to him-then the rule for
139. The cases cited in note 110 spra, exemplify the division of function betveen
judge and jury in these cases. In each of them the court lays dowm the general rule
and holds that its application to the facts of the case was for the jury under appropriate
instructions. Blodgett v. B. H. Dyas & Co., 4 Cal. 2d 511, 50 P2d 801 (1935), illustrates
what happens when a court feels that the danger is so obvious that defendant had no
further duty with reference to it. And ef. cases cited in note 11 .spra.
140. The cases referred to in note 133 supra, furnish exmmples of this. As to the
general trend in accident cases, see Nxon, Changing Rules of Liability if Autoknobile
Accident Litigation, 3 LAw & Coxrmisp. Pnon. 476 (1936) ; Searl, Automnobile LiJbility
Law Develotrnent & Trend, 39 BusT's I-is. Nuws 53 (Fire & Cas. ed. 193S); James,
Ftuntions of Judge & Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 Y= LJ. 667 (1949); James,
Chief Jus ice Maltbie & the Law of Negligence, 24 Com . B.J. 61, 63 e seq. (1950).
Cf. Campbell v. Hughes Prov. Co., 87 Ohio App. 151, 94 N.E.2d 273 (1949), aff'd,
153 Ohio 9, 90 N.E2d 694 (1950), in which the court made short work of defendant's
claim that a jury could not find the arrangement of its store to be negligent vwthout
"competent evidence of the departure from some standard." S7 Ohio App. at 157, 94
N.E2d at 276.
141. Witness the almost complete repudiation of it in master and servant cases. See
notes 83, 84 supra.
142. See, e.g., CLAra, CODE PLnEADIG 303 n. 77 (2d ed. 1947) ; Pnossm, ToTs 376-7
(1941) ; 65 C.J.S. 921 (1950) ; 2 RoBERTs, FmaLu LLBnavms or CAmis § 1021 (2d
ed. 1929) (under FELA before 1939 amendment).
143. This seems to be generally assumed. See, e.g., remarks of Best, C. J., in Riley
v. Home, 5 Bing. 217, 223 (C.P. 1828) (implying that the carrier must prove plaintiff's
knowledge of the notice limiting the risk), and the pleadings in Porteous v. Adams F-xp.
Co., 115 Minn. 281, 132 NAV. 296 (1911) ; Francis v. So. Pac. Co., 162 F.2d 813 (1947).
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pleading or proving contributory negligence should apply. 144 As we are
using the term here, however, assumption of risk in the primary sense does not,
analytically, describe a defense at all. It is simply a left-handed way of describ-
ing a lack of duty. And it can be urged with considerable logical force that it is
plaintiff's burden to plead and show a breach of duty towards him.145 So it is
not surprising that whenever the kind of situation dealt with in this study is
analyzed in terms of duty, the courts do assign to plaintiff the burden to nega-
tive what, upon a different approach, would be regarded as assumption of risk.
Thus the licensee on land 146 (or the borrower of an automobile) 147 must show
as part of his case that his licensor (or lender) knew of the concealed defect
which caused the injury, yet failed to disclose it. It is not enough in either case
to show that the defect was dangerous and could be discovered by a reasonble
inspection. In other words plaintiff must take the risk that injured him out
of the class of those he assumed.
On the other hand it might well be pointed out that wherever assumption of
risk, in the primary sense, applies, this means that there is an exceptional cur-
tailment of defendant's duty below the generally prevailing one to take care to
conduct oneself so as not to cause unreasonable danger to others. From this,
it could be urged that a defendant who would escape the general rule requiring
due care should plead and prove facts which bring him within an exception
to it. This could be urged the more strongly since these exceptions represent
a doubtful policy indeed and are back eddies in a rising tide of liability at least
for the injurious consequences of unreasonably dangerous acts and omissions,
i.e. of negligence. And if such a result is thought desirable perhaps it is more
likely to be reached here through the back door of assumption of risk-which
makes a lack of duty look like a defense-than through a more straight-forward
analysis.
Appraisal
The doctrine of asumption of risk, however it is analyzed and defined, is
in most of its aspects a defendant's doctrine which restricts liability and so cuts
down the compensation of accident victims. It is a heritage of the extreme
144. Under modern law the burden of pleading and proving contributory negligence
is generally on defendant. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 619 (2d ed. 1947).
145. See, e.g., the reasoning in Martin v. Des Moines E. L. Co., 131 Iowa 724, 106
N.W. 359 (1906) ; Rosedoff v. Consolidated R. Co., 94 N.H. 114, 47 A.2d 574 (1946) ;
LABA r, § 1608. A distinction was sometimes made in master and servant cases between,
ordinary risks (which the servant had to plead and prove that he did not assume) and
extraordinary risks (assumption of which was an affirmative defense). Cf. text, at notes
86 et seq., szopra.
146. Brinkmeyer v. United I. & M. Co., 168 Md. 149, 177 Atd. 171 (1935); Stevenson
v. Kansas C.S.R. Co., 348 Mo. 1216, 159 S.W.2d 260 (1941); Pieckowitz v. Oliver I. & S.
Co., 351 Pa. 209, 40 A.2d 416 (1944).
147. Johnson v. H. M. Bullard Co., 95 Conn. 251, 111 Atl. 70 (1920); Diekason v.
Dickason, 84 Mont. 52, 274 Pac. 145 (1929).
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individualism of the early industrial revolution. But quite aside from any
questions of policy or of substance, the concept of assuming the risk is purely
duplicative of other more widely understood concepts, such as scope of duty
or contributory negligence. 4 s The one exception is to be found, perhaps, in
those cases where there is an actual agreement. Moreover, the expression has
come to stand for two or three distinct notions which are not at all the same,
though they often overlap in the sense that they are applicable to the same
situation.
Except for express assumption of risk, therefore, the term and the concept
should be abolished. It adds nothing to modem law except confusion. For the
most part the policy of individualism it represents is outmoded in accident law;
where it is not, that policy can find full scope and far better expression in
other language. There is only one thing that can be said for assumption of
risk. In the confusion it introduces, it sometimes-ironicaly and quite capri-
ciously-leads to a relaxation of an overstrict rule in some other field. The
aura of disfavor that has come to surround it may occasionally turn out to
be the kiss of death to some other bad rule with which it has become associated.
We have seen how this may happen with the burden of pleading and proving
an exceptional limitation on the scope of defendant's duty. There may be other
instancesJ 49 But at best this sort of thing is a poor excuse indeed for continu-
ing the confusion of an unfortunate form of words.
148. It has been said, "If the words 'assumption of risk' were dropped from the
vocabulary of the courts, it is doubtful that there would be any change in established
legal principles governing the relationship of host and guest, whether in the real property
or the automobile cases." Rice, The Automobile Guest & the Rationale of Assumption
of Risk, 27 MIftm. L. Riv. 429, 439, 440 (1943). But cf. White, Liability of an Ato-
mobile Driver to a Non-Paing Passenqer, 20 VA. L. RE%. 326, 347 (1934).
149. See Gordon, IWrong Turns in the Volens Cases, 61 L.Q. Rnv. 140, 145 ct scq.
(1945), which suggests that preoccupation with the doctrine of Volens sometimes led
courts to grant recovery to a workman who could avoid this defense (as by showing
protest against the risk, or a promise to remedy it) whereas accurate analysis of the case
would reveal no breach of duty by the employer.
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